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JURISTOCRACY IN THE TRENCHES: PROBLEM-SOLVING
JUDGES AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE IN
DRUG TREATMENT COURTS AND UNIFIED
FAMILY COURTS
RICHARD BOLDT*
JANA SINGER*
Many who write about the shifting role of judges in the United
States focus their attention on the Supreme Court. In her 1994 book,
A Nation Under Lawyers, Mary Ann Glendon argues that the "classical"
Justices of an earlier generation, including Holmes, Cardozo, and
Frankfurter, have been replaced on the contemporary Supreme Court
by "romantic" Justices, who conceive of their role and their authority
in ways that fundamentally are at odds with longstanding tradition.1
The "classical ideal," suggests Glendon, was "associated with modesty,
impartiality, restraint, and interpretive skill."' The "romantic" judge,
by contrast, is "bold, creative, compassionate, result-oriented, and lib-
erated from legal technicalities."'
Glendon is not just concerned about the changing nature of the
Supreme Court, she also is worried that unreconstructed romanticism
on the part of the Justices and other high visibility judicial actors en-
courages other more ordinary judges within the legal system to aban-
don their traditional role in favor of the thrills of unbridled judicial
activism.4 Indeed, she reports that the "romantic ideal" has already
"fired the imaginations of judges in the capillaries of the legal sys-
tem"5 so that these trial level state courtjudges are more interested in
crafting solutions that register as fair according to their own personal
moral compasses than in undertaking the neutral application of au-
thoritative legal principles to facts fairly found. Notwithstanding her
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1. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAwYERs 4-5 (1994).
2. Id. at 152.
3. Id.
4. As Glendon puts it:
Like deficit spending or toxic-waste dumping, the regime effects of romantic
judging are not easy to discern until the harm has reached crisis proportions. But
just as impartial judges are beacons, leading public servants of all sorts in the
direction of reasoned adherence to principle, romantic judges are pied pipers
enticing bureaucrats everywhere to new heights of arrogance and abuse of power.
5. Id. at 168-69 (footnote omitted).
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description of the contemporary Supreme Court as activist, Glendon
holds out hope that the Justices' example may come to be regarded as
"a poor guide to how judges throughout the system should comport
themselves as a general matter" because "[t]he unique political role of
the nation's highest court" may be understood to require a different
set of qualities than those demanded of lower courts, which Glendon
describes as the "heroism of sticking to one's last, of demonstrating
impartiality, interpretive skill, and responsibility toward authoritative
sources in the regular administration of justice."6
There are plenty of interesting questions to pursue regarding the
claims that Glendon and others have made about the shifting nature
of the Supreme Court. It is fair to ask whether the current Justices
really are more activist than were their predecessors and whetherJus-
tices Holmes and Frankfurter were as restrained as Glendon suggests.
If a shift has indeed taken place, we should try to identify those factors
within our broader politics that have contributed to it and catalogue
the consequences for participatory democracy of an expansion of, and
change in the nature of, judicial power. In addition, it is worth exam-
ining Glendon's suggestion that the judicial romanticism of Justices
William Douglas, William Brennan, and Anthony Kennedy has spread
downward and outward to ordinary judges in ordinary courts through-
out the United States and the related claim that this growing judicial
activism among lower court judges has been caused, at least in part, by
the behavior of the High Court.7 Moreover, if the consequences for
democratic politics of judicial romanticism on the Supreme Court are
worthy of study, then so too are the consequences for democratic
politics of judicial romanticism among judges in the "capillaries of the
legal system,"8 those who sit on trial-level courts throughout the land.
This Essay briefly examines developments in two related capilla-
ries: drug treatment courts and unified family courts (UFCs). As
Glendon suggests, the judges who serve on these "problem-solving"
courts have largely repudiated the classical virtues of restraint, dis-
interest, and modesty, replacing these features of the traditional judi-
cial role with bold, engaged, action-oriented norms.9 But the causes
and consequences of this role-shift are complex; it is unlikely that the
proliferation of these unconventional courts has very much to do with
the pronouncements of hubristic Justices on the Supreme Court. In-
id. at 161.
6. Id. at 169-70.
7. Id. at 161-62.
8. Id. at 161.
9. Id. at 152.
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stead, it seems clear that each is the product of a unique process of
interaction among political, social, and institutional forces. The drug
court movement has been sparked in significant measure by political
overreaching on the part of state legislatures in the formulation of
criminal justice policy and by the need of individual judges to reclaim
a sense of efficacy in the face of criminal sentencing provisions that
increasingly have transformed judicial officers into mid-level bureau-
crats embedded within the administrative state. Unified family courts,
by contrast, reflect the joint efforts of state legislators, administrators,
and court officials to cope with burgeoning caseloads and demands
for services brought on by significant changes in family structure and
in the legal doctrines applicable to divorce and parenting disputes.
Thus, in both areas, changes in judicial behavior have less to do with
role modeling within the judicial branch and more to do with political
pressures and institutional relationships among legislatures, courts,
and administrative agencies.
I. DRUG TREATMENT COURTS
Specialized drug courts or court calendars began appearing in
the mid-1980s as a consequence of a dramatic increase in the number
of drug-related cases that were flooding the criminal system.1" Origi-
nally, these drug courts were designed to expedite drug cases in order
to reduce the crushing caseloads occasioned by the "war on drugs."
Beginning in Dade County, Florida in 1989, however, a new kind of
court began to appear.1' These drug treatment courts were different
from the expedited drug calendars in that they were designed to inte-
grate traditional criminal case processing features with community-
based substance abuse treatment resources. While many variations on
the basic model can be found, certain "key components" of the drug
treatment court approach are regarded by advocates as essential.12
These key features include: the referral of defendants to substance
abuse treatment facilities in the community; the use of the threat of
traditional criminal penalties as leverage to retain defendants in treat-
ment; judicial monitoring of defendants' progress in treatment
through the use of regular urinalysis testing and periodic "status hear-
ings" in open court; and the imposition of increasingly severe "gradu-
10. Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1207-09 (1998).
11. Candace McCoy, The Politics of Problem-Solving: An Overview of the Origins and Develop-
ment of Therapeutic Courts, 40 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 1513, 1517 (2003).
12. DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMM., NAT'L ASS'N OF DRUG COURT PROF'Ls, DEFINING
DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS (1997).
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ated sanctions," in instances of noncompliance with the treatment
regime, and graduated rewards for successes.'"
Hundreds of drug treatment courts have been established
throughout the United States. There is a National Association of
Drug Court Professionals with a membership in the thousands; annual
conferences are held, and professional publications abound. 4 The
response to the drug treatment court movement by the media and by
politicians has been extraordinarily positive. As James Nolan, a keen
observer of the movement, has put it: "Conservatives support [drug
treatment courts] because of [their] tough intrusive nature and liber-
als because of [their] ostensibly more humane and compassionate ap-
proach toward offenders. In many important ways the style and scope
of the drug court transcend conventional political categories." 15
Perhaps no single characteristic of the drug treatment court
movement has been as important as its frank pragmatism. The archi-
tects and supporters of these courts variously have claimed that they
are an effective response to criminal justice system overload brought
about by the war on drugs, a means of reducing the high expenditure
of resources by other criminal justice agencies necessitated by the
lengthy prison sentences that many drug offenders receive, a useful
way to insure that the revolving door of addiction and criminality is
interrupted through the use of effective therapeutic approaches to
drug use disorders, and an attractive alternative to the "assembly-line
justice" that has distorted the adversary system.16 Given these claims
about efficacy, it should come as little surprise that drug treatment
courts have served as the conceptual model for a number of more
recent problem-solving courts, including domestic violence courts,
gun courts, mental health courts, community courts, re-entry courts,
and others that also stake their existence on a set of pragmatic asser-
tions about "what works."
1 7
13. STEVEN BELENKO, RESEARCH ON DRUG COURTS 6-7 (1998).
14. McCoy, supra note 11, at 1523.
15. James L. Nolan, Jr., Therapeutic Adjudication, SoCIETv, Jan./Feb. 2002, at 29, 29.
16. McCoy, supra note 11, at 1517-18.
17. PAMELA CASEY & WILLIAM E. HEWIT17, COURT RESPONSES TO INDIVIDUALS IN NEED OF
SERVICES: PROMISING COMPONENTS OF A SERVICE COORDINATION STRATEGY FOR COURTS 23,
26-29 (2001). The current popularity of drug treatment courts has combined with two
other phenomena to spur the development of a second generation of therapeutic or prob-
lem-solving courts. One phenomenon is the spreading influence of "therapeutic jurispru-
dence," a theoretical perspective originally developed to critique existing legal regimes by
demonstrating their anti-therapeutic effects. Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Problem Solving Courts, 30 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1055 (2003). For further discussion of thera-
peutic jurisprudence, see infra Part III.
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At a rhetorical level, this thoroughgoing pragmatism contrasts
with the claims of procedural regularity and retributive justice that
generally predominate in our system of criminal blaming and criminal
sentencing. On the process side, the criminal system generally is
thought of in terms of formal adversarial disputing, notwithstanding
its pervasive reliance on plea negotiations. Two key features of the
traditional adversarial model are its use of neutral, detached deci-
sionmakers and formal rules of procedure. Taken together, these two
features reflect an understanding that the interests of an individual
criminal defendant ordinarily are adverse to those of the state and
that the structure of a criminal prosecution is inherently unstable. As
Martin Shapiro long ago observed, the triadic configuration of a crim-
inal prosecution (or any adversarial proceeding) is prone to collapse
into "two against one" once the decisionmaker announces a winner
and a loser.18 To prevent the delegitimating consequences of such a
collapse, our system ordinarily relies upon formality and neutrality to
prevent even the appearance of an alliance between the judge and the
prevailing party.19 In drug treatment courts, by contrast, the stabiliz-
ing influence of judicial neutrality and formal rules of procedure are
diminished precisely because the interests of the defendant are now
seen as consonant with those of the state. The notion that the judge is
bound to adopt a "neutral position in the resolution of conflict" is
replaced in these courts by a role conception in which "the judge is
partisan, aiming to cure the offender of his addiction."20 In effect, the
A second intersecting dynamic is the growing recognition by judges and others that
traditional courts are ill equipped to deal with the broad array of social pathologies that
flood through the courthouse doors. As ChiefJudge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of
Appeals has explained it:
We've witnessed the breakdown of the family and of other traditional safety nets.
So what we're seeing in the courts is many, many more substance abuse cases. We
have a huge number of domestic violence cases. We have many, many more qual-
ity-of-life crimes. And it's not just the subject of the cases that's different. We get
a lot of repeat business. We're recycling the same people through the system.
Greg Berman, "What Is a Traditional Judge Anyway?7': Problem Solving in the State Courts, 84
JUDICATURE 78, 80 (2000).
The result of this confluence of practice (the hundreds of operating drug treatment
courts around the country and the growing recognition of underlying pathologies) and
theory (the spread of therapeutic jurisprudence from a few academics to scores of influen-
tial judges and other policymakers) has been the creation of numerous other problem-
solving courts. See infra Part IV.
18. Martin Shapiro, The Logic of the Triad, in 5 FRED I. GREENSTEIN & NEWSON W. POLSBY,
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 321 (1975), reprinted in THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE
284, 285 (Robert M. Cover & Owen M. Fiss eds., 1979).
19. Id. at 286.
20. Philip Bean, America's Drug Courts: A New Development in Criminal Justice, 1996 CRiuM.
L. REv. 718, 720.
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judge is understood to be the leader of the defendant patient's "treat-
ment team" and to be performing a therapeutic function on his or her
behalf.21
The judicial undertakings that result from this redefinition of
role are remarkable. As Nolan points out, drug treatment court
judges see themselves as privileged to engage the defendants in their
courtrooms on an unmediated, personal level. 22 They prize "em-
pathetic connection," often encourage hugs, and take personally the
successes and failures of those who appear before them.2 3 And, from
time to time, they send their "clients" to jail.24
The frank pragmatism of drug treatment court judges also is in
tension with the substantive claim that criminal blaming and sentenc-
ing in the United States is primarily directed toward the accomplish-
21. Richard C. Boldt, The Adversary System and Attorney Role in the )rug Treatment Court
Movement, in DRUG COURTS: IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 115, 124 (James L. Nolan, Jr. ed.,
2002).
The fact that drug court judges are directly involved in the tasks of monitoring
defendants' behavior and imposing sanctions or conferring rewards is more than
merely stylistic. Many substance abusers in the initial stages of recovery are most
likely to be helped by a treatment regime focused on "practical problem solving
and the acquisition of cognitive-behavioral relapse prevention skills," which a
judge is capable of managing. . . . In operational terms, this means that the
judge's role in sanctioning and rewarding defendants is to help them understand
that their choices have consequences for which they will be held responsible, and
that they control their own fate. Thus, when the judge responds promptly to a
positive urine test or a missed group therapy meeting with a proportional sanc-
tion, he or she is helping to provide treatment to the defendant.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
22. Nolan, supra note 15, at 34. Indeed, it is not unheard of for these judges to involve
themselves in their "clients'" lives outside of the courtroom by visiting them at home or
work or by sponsoring social events such as picnics. Id.
23. Id. at 34-35.
24. Nolan describes one instance in which a drug court judge's activism resulted in the
forging of an employment arrangement between the judge and his client's employer,
which, if breached, would result in the client's incarceration. Id. at 32.
A participant in Judge McKinney's Syracuse, New York drug court lost his job.
McKinney called the employer and learned that the client was regarded as a
"damn good employee" and that the boss would "hire him back in a heartbeat" if
the judge could guarantee that he was drug free and wouldn't miss any work. So
the judge made a deal with the employer. He said to him: "Okay, I'll make a deal
with you, you take him back and I'll add another weapon to your arsenal. If he
doesn't come to work when he is supposed to, doesn't come to work on time, if
he comes to work under the influence ... ,I'll put him in jail, on your say so."
[The judge told the client about the deal.] "I'll get your job back for you, but
you've got to promise you'll be at work when you are supposed to and not take
any drugs. Your employer is now on the team of people who are reporting to me.
When he calls up and tells me that you are late or that you're not there, I'm going
to send the cops out to arrest you."
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ment of retributive justice.25  Drug treatment courts place an
enormous premium on individualized dispositions, even when this
process of individualization comes at the expense of consistency in
sentencing: a goal that was at the center of the decline of the rehabili-
tative ideal thirty years ago and that has played an important role in
the dramatic growth of determinate sentencing schemes. In fact,
there is good reason to conclude that the energetic support drug
treatment courts have received from judges has a great deal to do with
their frustration over contemporary sentencing policy.26 Judges see in
these courts an opportunity to redefine their role in response to the
diminished judicial discretion and autonomy brought about by the de-
terminate sentencing movement, sentencing grids and guidelines,
and the straightjacket of mandatory minimum sentences." "A com-
mon frustration expressed by drug courtjudges is the unwelcome con-
straints they experience from legislatively imposed mandatory
minimum sentences. Drug courts are liberating in that they allow
more flexibility in the way a judge can respond to a client."2"
As Nolan and others have demonstrated, the drug court move-
ment was not a grassroots effort; rather, it was the product of ex-
traordinary advocacy by "a few hardworking and charismatic judges,"
by Janet Reno, who had been the prosecutor in Miami when the first
25. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2004) ("The Legislature finds and
declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment. This purpose is best
served by terms proportionate to the seriousness of the offense with provision for uniform-
ity in the sentences of offenders committing the same offense under similar
circumstances.").
26. As Judge John Schwartz of the Rochester New York Drug Treatment Court ex-
plains: "Ourjob is to make sure justice is done. Ourjob is also to punish, but what's the
point of punishing if it doesn't work. I mean, 70% of our clientele in the criminal justice
system had drug problems. It's about time we learned how to deal with them." Nolan,
supra note 15, at 37.
27. See Nolan, supra note 15, at 36 (describing the appeal of the flexible drug court
model); see also McCoy, supra note 11, at 1529 (noting the more active role played by drug
court judges).
Relatedly, the development of drug treatment courts may have something to do with a
growing moral fatigue over the war on drugs. Paul Butler has made a compelling case for
viewing the sentencing practices that have resulted from that "war" as inconsistent with
retributive principles and particularly with the requirement that punishment be propor-
tionate to the harm of the offender's offense. Paul Butler, Retribution, For Liberals, 46
UCLA L. REv. 1873, 1892 (1999). In these terms, we simply have been over-punishing drug
offenders, particularly drug possession and low-level distribution defendants. See id. at
1884-88 (concluding that nonviolent offenses, such as drug possession, should receive less
severe punishment than violent offenses). If this is correct, the spread of drug treatment
courts may have been encouraged, at least in part, by a pragmatic understanding that they
provide political cover for judges who believe it is right to impose less severe penalties in
drug cases.
28. Nolan, supra note 15, at 36.
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such court was created, and by a Justice Department-led federal fund-
ing effort that pumped more than $80 million and enormous addi-
tional resources in the form of technical assistance into the effort in
its formative years.29 The support of the Clinton administration's Jus-
tice Department was premised on the belief that these courts were
capable of responding over time to system overload by reducing recid-
ivism rates among criminal offenders with substance-use disorders.30
The jury is still very much out on the empirical question whether drug
treatment court graduates have fewer relapses and lower recidivism
rates over time than comparable offenders processed through the
traditional criminal system,"' and the current administration has not
made the support of drug treatment courts a particular priority. In
addition, given the sheer volume of business in the criminal courts, it
29. McCoy, supra note 11, at 1525-26.
[T]here has been a remarkably successful program of technical assistance and
transfer of expertise from the federal level to the states. Although the idea of
creating drug courts was first conceived by court professionals operating at the
local level, the rapid growth of the movement as a whole was catalyzed by a con-
siderable infusion of resources from the federal government. Once federally sup-
ported drug courts had become entrenched in local legal cultures, state and local
governments began to implement drug courts on their own, without federal
funding.
Id. at 1527.
30. Id, at 1523.
31. In 2004, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (the office of the Drug Czar)
and the National Drug Court Institute released their first National Report Card on Drug
Courts. C. WEST HUDDLESTON, III ET AL., NAT'L DRUG COURT INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT
PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM SOLVING COURT
PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2004), available at http://www.ndci.org/publications/
paintingcurrentpicture.pdf. The report card gave these courts an A for reducing recidi-
vism. Id. at 1-2. In 2002, by contrast, the General Accounting Office (GAO) published its
own report, in which the GAO concluded that it "lack[ed] vital information" necessary to
determine whether drug courts are effective. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-434,
DRUG COURTS: BETTER DOJ DATA COLLECTION AND EVALUATION EFFORTS NEEDED TO MFA-
SURE IMPACT OF DRUG COURT PROGRAMS 18 (2002). In particular, the GAO report indi-
cated that most follow-up studies, including many of the studies upon which the National
Report Card was based, used biased comparison samples, such as offenders who declined to
participate in drug court or were deemed ineligible, measured the recidivism rates of drug
court graduates rather than the entire experimental group of drug court participants and
generally failed to employ randomized experimental groups. See Douglas B. Marlowe et al.,
A Sober Assessment of Drug Courts, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 153, 156 (2003) (emphasizing that
additional research is needed to properly evaluate the efficacy of drug courts). The GAO
published a follow-up report in 2005 that reviewed more than twenty methodologically
sound evaluations of drug treatment courts. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
05-219, ADULT DRUG COURTS: EVIDENCE INDICATES RECIDIVISM REDUCTIONS AND MIXED RE-
SULTS FOR OTHER OUTCOMES 2-3 (2005) (explaining the selection criteria for the twenty-
seven chosen evaluations). In this most recent report, the GAO concluded that drug treat-
ment court participants do appear to have lower recidivism rates while they are "within-
program" but that "[e]vidence about the effectiveness of drug court programs in reducing
participants' substance use relapse is limited and mixed." Id. at 5-6.
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is clear that drug treatment courts "have barely made a dent. '32 Nev-
ertheless, the movement has remained vibrant, largely because judges
do not want to give up the autonomy and sense of efficacy they derive
from these courts. 'Judges even go so far as to argue that the drug
court has positive therapeutic outcomes for the judge. As two judges
write, 'judging in this non-traditional form becomes an invigorating,
self-actualizing and rewarding exercise.' ,
In the final analysis, the most interesting question about the judi-
cial romanticism of the drug treatment court movement is whether it
has had a positive or negative influence on the politics of crime con-
trol and drug policy. Criminal trial court judges are ordinary judges
who generally do not challenge the authority of the political branches
by passing on the constitutionality of democratically enacted laws;
rather, their activism, when expressed, is most likely to grow out of
their role as implementers of the law. From this perspective, drug
treatment courts could be regarded as anti-democratic because they
function as enclaves within which the dominant legislative commit-
ments to retributive punishment and determinate sentencing are re-
placed by therapeutic interventions undertaken at the initiative of
mostly unelected judges.34 On the other hand, it may be that the
drug treatment court movement is anti-democratic precisely because
it has taken drug policy and crime control issues out of the political
process or at least provided a release valve that has made it more diffi-
cult to organize broad political opposition to the still-ongoing war on
drugs.35 If this turns out to be the case, then drug treatment courts
32. McCoy, supra note 11, at 1528.
33. Nolan, supra note 15, at 38.
34. It is worth noting, however, that Congress and some state legislatures have adopted
legislation supporting the development of drug treatment courts. "Legislatures in Florida,
Idaho, New Mexico, Texas and Wyoming recently passed measures to expand drug courts."
Donna Lyons, Conviction for Addiction, 28 ST. LEGISLATURSS 18, 20 (2002). Additionally,
Tide II of the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act
reauthorized federal grant support for drug treatment courts. Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 2951,
116 Stat. 1758, 1795 (2002).
35. There are signs of hope that the politics of drug policy and crime control are shift-
ing. On November 7, 2000, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act, also known as
Proposition 36 (Prop. 36), was passed by sixty-one percent of California voters. Kelly
Lieupo & Susan P. Weinstein, Ballot Initiatives-Wolves in Sheep's Clothing, DRUG CT. REv.,
2004, at 49, 56. This ballot initiative, which was vigorously opposed by drug treatment
court judges throughout the state, allows first- and second-time, nonviolent drug offenders
the opportunity to receive substance abuse treatment instead of incarceration. Id. at 57.
In addition, it allocated $120 million annually for five-and-a-half years to pay for new treat-
ment services. Lyons. supra note 34, at 18. While this is still a developing story, it may be
that Prop. 36 and a similar measure approved in Arizona in 1996 represent the beginnings
of a new progressive politics in this area. Reformers have worked to place similar proposals
on the ballot in Florida, Oregon, and a number of other states, and there is some evidence
[VoL. 65:82
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may prove to be more therapeutic for judges than for individual de-
fendants or for the health of the broader community.
II. UNIFIED FAMILY COURTS
Although drug treatment courts and unified family courts share a
number of defining features, their origins are distinct. Unified family
courts are an outgrowth of the juvenile court movement of the early
twentieth century.36 But unlike the early juvenile court model, which
was dealt a decisive blow by the due process revolution of the 1960s
and 1970s, the unified family court movement has gained momentum
over the past few decades.17 Unified family court systems are charac-
terized by a holistic approach to family legal problems, an emphasis
on problem-solving and alternative dispute resolution, and the provi-
sion and coordination of a comprehensive range of court-connected
family servicesY.3  The goal of proceedings in a unified family court is
not merely to resolve a family's legal problems but to "address the
underlying psychological and emotional issues causing the dysfunc-
tion, which will result in a lessened need for further court
intervention."
3 9
that the success of Prop. 36 has reshaped the public policy debate in other state legisla-
tures. See id. at 20 (noting the widespread adoption of the drug court model by states
following the enactment of Prop. 36).
36. Barbara A. Babb, Univ. of Baltimore Law Sch., Remarks at the Eleventh Annual
Symposium on Contemporary Urban Challenges (Mar. 1, 2002), in Problem Solving Courts:
From Adversarial Litigation to Innovative Jurisprudence, 29 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1929, 1944
(2002); see also Barbara A. Babb, Where We Stand: An Analysis of America's Family Law Adjudi-
catory Systems and the Mandate to Establish Unified Family Courts, 32 FAM. L.Q. 31, 35-36 (1998)
(discussing the historical development of family courts).
37. Catherine J. Ross, The Failure of Fragmentation: The Promise of a System of Unified Fam-
ily Courts, 32 FAm. L.Q. 3, 13 (1998) ("In the last few years ... more and more states have
created, initiated, or experimented with, some version of unified family court in all or part
of their jurisdictions.").
38. Id. Although the precise structure of unified family courts varies by jurisdiction,
proponents and scholars have identified several components as "essential to a genuine
unified family court system." Id. at 15. These include: (1) comprehensive subject-matter
jurisdiction over family-related legal matters; (2) a "one family, one team" assignment sys-
tem, designed to ensure that all matters affecting a family are handled by a single judge or
judicial team; (3) an emphasis on interdisciplinary training and collaboration; and (4) the
provision and coordination of a comprehensive range of court-connected family services.
Id.; see also James W. Bozzomo & Gregory Scolieri, A Survey of Unified Family Courts: An
Assessment of DifferentJurisdictional Models, 42 FAm. CT. REv. 12, 12-13 (2004) (describing the
framework and common characteristics of a unified family court).
39. Erin J. May, Note, Social Reform for Kentucky's Judicial System: The Creation of Unified
Family Courts, 92 Ky. L.J. 571, 584 (2004) (footnotes omitted); see Paul A. Williams, A Unified
Family Court for Missouri, 63 UMKC L. REv. 383, 396-97 (1994) (noting that the purpose of a
unified family court goes beyond dispute resolution and includes providing families with
the skills necessary to avoid resorting to the legal system in the future).
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Developments both within and outside of the legal system have
contributed to the rise of unified family courts. The American Bar
Association (ABA) has made the creation and strengthening of uni-
fied family courts a national priority and "has played a leading role
nationally in developing the concepts" that underlie the unified fam-
ily court movement.4" In 1994, the ABA adopted a resolution con-
firming its commitment to unified family courts and articulating a set
of guiding principles and components for unified family court sys-
tems.4" In 1996, with financial support from the Robert Wood John-
son Foundation, the ABA established pilot unified family courts in
Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Washington, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico.4 2 Over the next three years, the ABA hosted two na-
tional invitational summits designed to provide leadership and strate-
gic planning advice to states considering the creation of unified family
courts.4 3 Since that time, the ABA has continued to provide compre-
hensive training, technical assistance, and ongoing consultation to
court reform efforts in this area."
Unified family courts are also a product of changes in the sub-
stantive legal doctrines governing divorce and child-related disputes
and the significant increase in caseloads that has accompanied these
doctrinal changes.45 Under the old, fault-based divorce regime, the
primary role of the family courtjudge was to ascertain which party was
to blame for the break-up of a marriage and to distribute marital as-
sets-including children-in line with this backwards-looking deter-
mination. Parenting disputes were treated as one-time, winner-take-all
proceedings, the goal of which was to award custody "rights" to the
more morally and psychologically worthy parent.46 Once the court
allocated custody and other marital rights, "its role in facilitating the
40. HerbertJ. Belgrad, An Introduction to Unfied Family Courts from the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Perspective, 37 FAM. L.Q. 329, 329 (2003).
41. American Bar Association Policy on Unified Family Courts, 32 FAm. L.Q. 1 (1998).
42. HerbertJ. Belgrad, The American Bar Association and Unified Family Courts: Introduc-
tion to a Survey, 42 FAM. CT. Rv. 10, 10 (2004).
43. Belgrad, supra note 40, at 330.
44. Belgrad, supra note 42, at 10. In 2002, the ABA Board of Governors established the
Unified Family Court Coordinating Council to coordinate and support the work of the
various ABA entities and projects engaged with unified family courts. Belgrad, supra note
40, at 330. "By establishing the Coordinating Council, the ABA reaffirmed its commitment
to the concepts and philosophy of the UFC system." Belgrad, supra note 42, at 10.
45. Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody Disputes: From Fault
Finder to Conflict Manager to Differential Case Management, 22 U. Aix. LITrLE ROCK L. REV.
395, 395 (2000).
46. Id.
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ongoing process of reorganizing the child's relationships with both
parents was [largely] over."47
With the shift from fault-based to no-fault divorce and the demise
of the sole-custody paradigm, the role of the family court judge has
shifted from the backward-looking task of assigning blame and adjudi-
cating rights, to the much more forward-looking role of supervising an
ongoing process of family reorganization. Family court judges no
longer function primarily as fault-finders or rights adjudicators but
rather as ongoing conflict managers.48 In this respect, the judicial
role in divorce-related custody cases has come to resemble its role in
other child welfare matters, with the court system assuming direct re-
sponsibility for children's well-being rather than serving as a passive
arbiter of disputes between adult claimants. Indeed, one leading fam-
ily law scholar has analogized the role of a modern family court judge
to a bankruptcy court overseeing the reorganization of a financially
distressed business:
The business is raising children and the parents-the man-
agers of the business-are in conflict about how that task is
to be accomplished. The court's aim is to get the managers
to voluntarily agree on a parenting plan rather than impose
one on them. The court uses education and mediation to
facilitate voluntary agreement. The court ratifies the parties'
agreement and only decides issues that the parents cannot
decide themselves. The court has an ongoing role in manag-
ing parental conflict; parents have continuing access to the
settlement processes if future disputes arise or modification
of the parenting plan is necessary because of changed
circumstances.49
These changes in legal doctrine were accompanied by a growing
conviction that traditional adversary procedures were ill-suited for
resolving family disputes, particularly those involving children.5 ° Crit-
ics of adversary justice pointed to social science evidence suggesting
that, particularly for children, divorce was not a one-time legal event
but an ongoing emotional and psychological process. 5 ' Research also
showed that children's adjustment to divorce depended significantly
on their parents' behavior during and after the separation process:
47. Id at 395-96.
48. Id. at 396.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children
and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 86-90 (1997).
51. Schepard, supra note 45, at 407.
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the higher the level of parental conflict to which children were ex-
posed, the more negative the effects of family dissolution.5 2 Other
social science research suggested that, in the absence of extreme pa-
rental conflict, children generally benefited from maintaining a rela-
tionship with both parents after divorce or separation, thus
undermining the traditional sole-custody paradigm with its "winner-
take-all" orientation.5" Armed with these social science findings, court
reformers argued that, to serve children's interests, family courts
should abandon the adversary paradigm in favor of alternative ap-
proaches that would help parents manage their conflict and en-
courage them to develop positive post-divorce co-parenting
relationships.54
Widespread changes in the structure of American families also
contributed to the pressure for family court reform. As both divorce
and nonmarital parenthood have become more common, growing
numbers of children are being raised by parents who are not other-
wise connected to each other.5 5 At the same time, shifts in gender
and parenting roles have meant that fathers, as well as mothers, see
themselves as active parents and are therefore likely to seek continu-
ing involvement in a child's life when a marriage or other adult rela-
tionship ends. 6 "Popular culture [has] reinforce[d] the notion that
fathers could be nurturing parents and should assert custody rights."
57
As a result of these demographic and cultural changes, parents
are far more likely than in the past to seek judicial intervention in
disputes about the care and custody of children.5 8 A judiciary com-
mitted to Glendon's classical virtues of "modesty, impartiality, re-
52. ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD CUS-
TODY, AND MEDIATION 205 (1994); see also Janet R. Johnston, High-Conflict Divorce, THE Fu-
TURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1994, at 165, 172-76 (summarizing research that examined the
effect of parental hostility on children); Vivienne Roseby, Uses of Psychological Testing in a
Child-Focused Approach to Child Custody Evaluations, 29 FAM. L.Q. 97, 101-04 (1995) (noting
the effect of "high-conflict" divorce on children and recommending measures for the child
custody process to mitigate the impact on children).
53. Schepard, supra note 45, at 396.
54. Id. at 406 ("These forces and the influx of cases that resulted caused a substantive
and procedural transformation of the child custody dispute resolution process from fault
finding and adversarial procedures to cooperative parenting and alternative dispute
resolution.").
55. See generally JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION
IN FAMILY LAW (2000) (examining the legal and social changes that have impacted parental
obligations to children).
56. Schepard, supra note 45, at 402.
57. Id. at 406.
58. See id at 399 (providing statistics that demonstrate the increase in domestic rela-
tions cases).
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straint, and interpretive skill" is unlikely to be able to cope effectively
with these increased demands.59
III. PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
Like other problem-solving courts, drug treatment courts and
unified family courts embrace the concept of therapeutic jurispru-
dence.6" Therapeutic jurisprudence sees law "as a kind of therapist or
therapeutic agent."61 Legal rules and procedures and the roles of le-
gal actors "constitute social forces that, whether intended or not, . . .
often produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences."62
"Therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that, other things being equal, posi-
tive therapeutic effects are desirable and should generally be a proper
aim of law, and that antitherapeutic effects are undesirable and
should be avoided or minimized."63
Like law and economics, therapeutic jurisprudence is a conse-
quentialist theory but rather than focusing on law's aggregate effects,
it trains its consequentialist lens on individual well-being. An impor-
tant goal of therapeutic justice is to maximize the positive effects of
legal interventions on the social, emotional, and psychological func-
tioning of individuals and families.6 4 The problem-solving judge is a
critical actor in this endeavor.
The role of the problem-solving judge stands in sharp contrast to
the image of the blindfolded balancer of scales. Rather than serving
as a dispassionate umpire, the problem-solving judge is charged with
improving the material and psychological well-being of those who
come before her.65 Rather than resolving discrete legal issues, the
problem-solving judge "attempt[s] to understand and address the un-
59. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 152.
60. Jeffrey A. Kuhn, A Seven-Year Lesson on Unified Family Courts: What We Have Learned
Since the 1990 National Family Court Symposium, 32 FAM. L.Q. 67, 67-68 (1998); see also JUDG-
ING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 7 (Bruce J.
Winick & David B. Wexler eds., 2003) (characterizing therapeutic jurisprudence "as a theo-
retical foundation for problem-solving courts and approaches").
61. Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 184, 185 (1997).
62. Id.; see also William G. Schma, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, MICH. BAR J., Jan. 2003, at
25, 26 (defining therapeutic jurisprudence as "the use of social science to study the extent
to which a legal rule or practice promotes the psychological and physical well-being of the
people it affects") (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Winick, supra note 61, at 188 (footnote omitted).
64. Id. at 189.
65. Andrew Schepard &James W. Bozzomo, Efficiency, Therapeutic Justice, Mediation, and
Evaluation: Reflections on a Survey of Unified Family Courts, 37 FuM. L.Q. 333, 339 (2003) ("A
UFC has an additional and vital goal beyond simple, efficient umpiring: to make the emo-
tional life of families and children better.").
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derlying problem" and helps participants "to effectively deal with the
problem in ways that will prevent recurring court involvement."66
Like other therapeutic agents, problem-solving judges in both the
drug treatment court and unified family court settings use their "au-
thority to motivate individuals to accept needed services and to moni-
tor [the parties'] compliance and progress."67 Thus, problem-solving
judges are concerned not merely with resolving disputes or assigning
responsibility but with achieving desirable behavioral change. More-
over, unlike the solitary, detached jurist who presides over a court-
room isolated from the outside world, the problem-solving judge
embraces collaborative and interdisciplinary approaches. The prob-
lem-solving judge often functions as a service coordinator and team
leader, connecting family members and criminal defendants to a vari-
ety of court-provided and community-based services and ensuring that
all members of the treatment team fulfill their roles.
Unlike traditional judges, who limit their focus to the parties
before them, the unified family court judge focuses holistically on the
family as a social system:
The UFC is based on the premise that family members are
interconnected emotionally, economically, and spiritually.
Any court order about one family member is likely to affect
all.... The legal label attached to the case is less important
to the delivery of therapeutic justice than the ability of the
court to make appropriate orders to address the underlying
dynamics causing the family to come to the court's attention
in the first place.68
This holistic orientation is reflected in the one-family, onejudge, pol-
icy endorsed by unified family court proponents.69 The central tenet
is that all matters involving the same family should be handled by a
single judge (or judicial team). Proponents argue that assigning one
judge to all cases involving the same family improves both the effi-
ciency and the quality of judicial decisionmaking.7 ° Critics, however,
66. Winick, supra note 17, at 1055.
67. Id. at 1060.
68. Schepard & Bozzomo, supra note 65, at 339-40.
69. Id. at 336.
70. See, e.g., Gloria Danziger, Delinquency Jurisdiction in a Unified Family Court: Balancing
Intervention, Prevention, and Adjudication, 37 FAm. L.Q. 381, 394 (2003) (asserting that "a
judge who is acquainted with the legal problems of each family member" and with "that
family's dynamics, history, and place in the community . . . can make more informed,
consistent, and effective decisions than ajudge who hears only one specific problem affect-
ing that family"); see also Ross, supra note 37, at 17 (arguing that the one-family, one-judge
policy "provides the decision-maker with a broad perspective on interrelated family
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have raised concerns that the one-family, one-judge policy may violate
due process because judges may have access to information about a
family that would normally be inadmissible and may draw inferences
from that knowledge which may compromise the ability to adjudicate
a matter fairly and impartially.7"
As with drug treatment courts, unified family courts combine
therapeutic interventions with coercion.72 For example, to obtain a
divorce in Maryland (and many other jurisdictions), parents may be
required to attend court-sponsored parent education classes,73 where
they are taught to make "child-focused" decisions and to communi-
cate with each other in ways that minimize the detrimental impact of
divorce on children. 4 If parents disagree about custody or visitation,
the court can require them to participate in mediation before they
may present their arguments to a judge.75
Proponents of both drug treatment courts and unified family
courts recognize the potential risks posed by problem-solving tech-
niques, and they acknowledge that therapeutic justice must be exer-
cised in a manner consistent with due process. 76  But their
prescriptions on how to do this are often disconcertingly vague.
Moreover, many proponents suggest that the risks of judicial over-
reaching are outweighed by the shortcomings of the traditional model
and the potential benefits of a therapeutic approach:
The risks that an overreaching and incompetent judge in a
UFC poses for a given family pales by comparison to the
chaos created for families already in crisis by a court system
that organizes judicial and support services by legal issue
problems that can prove indispensable to crafting solutions appropriate to the particular
family").
71. Anne H. Geraghty & WallaceJ. Mlyniec, Unified Family Courts: Tempering Enthusiasm
with Caution, 40 FAm. CT. REv. 435, 439 (2002). But seeJim Moye, Don't Tread on Me to Help
Me: Does the District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001 Violate Due Process by Extolling the "One
Family, One Judge" Theory?, 57 SMU L. REv. 1521, 1533-35 (2004) (concluding that due
process criticisms are misplaced).
72. See Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Justice: A Quiet Revolution, 86
JUDICATURE 182, 182 (2003) ("The bottom line is that problem-solving courts combine
punishment and help in an effort both to ii.iprove public safety and prevent recidivism.").
73. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 7-103.2 (LexisNexis 1999); MD. R. 9-204.
74. See Barry B. Frieman et al., Parenting Seminars for Divorcing Parents: One Year Later, 33
J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 129, 130-32 (2000) (describing seminars which help divorcing
and separating parents focus on the needs of their children).
75. MD. R. 9-205(b)(1).
76. E.g., Danziger, supra note 70, at 394-97; Schepard & Bozzomo, supra note 65, at 341-
43. See generally Eric Lane, Due Process and Problem-Solving Courts, 30 FoIRHAM URB. L.J. 955
(2003) (using case studies to explore due process issues raised by problem-solving courts).
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rather than by addressing the needs of families as a whole
and the interrelationships among family members.7"
IV. BEYOND DRUG TREATMENT COURTS AND UNIFIED FAMILY COURTS
Although therapeutic judging originated in specialized problem-
solving courts such as drug treatment courts and unified family courts,
its influence has spread to state courts of general jurisdiction. In a
joint resolution adopted in 2000, the Conference of Chief Justices and
the Conference of State Court Administrators endorsed the notion of
problem-solving courts and calendars and the broad integration of
principles of therapeutic jurisprudence into state court processes to
improve the administration of justice.7" Similarly, in 2001, the ABA
recommended "the continued development of problem-solving courts
to improve court processes and court outcomes for litigants, victims
and communities" as well as the "broad integration of the principles
and methods employed by problem-solving courts into the daily ad-
ministration of justice."79
Based upon this mainstream support, jurisdictions around the
country have established a variety of therapeutic or problem-solving
courts. These include community courts that focus "primarily on low-
level 'quality of life' crimes," such as drug possession, disorderly con-
duct, and prostitution; domestic violence courts that attempt to "in-
sure victim safety and batterer accountability" by creating an
"integrated community justice response" and providing supervised
treatment; and mental health courts that have been developed to link
mentally ill criminal defendants with "needed services in an expedited
manner and to monitor individual defendants' progress" in treat-
ment. o Indeed, a December 2003 survey found more than 1,600
problem-solving court programs operating in all fifty states and the
District of Columbia." Several scholars have described these develop-
ments as a "quiet revolution . . . taking place in the courts. 8 2
To the extent that state court systems have embraced these devel-
opments, Glendon's wistful suggestion that judges in the "capillaries
77. Schepard & Bozzomo, supra note 65, at 341.
78. Conference of Chief Justices & Conference of State Court Administrators Resolu-
tion in Support of Problem-Solving Courts, in JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note
60, at 113-14.
79. COMM. ON STATE JUSTICE INITIATIVES, AM. BAR ASS'N, COALITION FOR JUSTICE, RE-
PORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1 (2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/leader-
ship/2001/117.pdf.
80. *CAsEY & HEwiTr, supra note 17, at 28.
81. HUDDLESTON ET AL., supra note 31, at 9 tbl.2.
82. Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 72, at 213.
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of the legal system" retain their traditional role as restrained and dis-
interested umpires seems anachronistic.83 Moreover, the development
of both drug treatment courts and unified family courts suggests that
judicial activism at the state trial level takes its cues not from the fed-
eral bench but from the political and institutional context in which
state courts operate. If state trial judges have rejected classical notions
of "modesty, impartiality, [and] restraint," it is not because they are
emulating an activist Supreme Court but because they are responding
to powerful political and institutional forces outside the judicial sys-
tem.84 Legal scholars who seek to understand juristocracy in the
trenches must therefore broaden their analytic focus to highlight the
ways in which these institutional forces shape the role and influence
the behavior of state court trial judges.
83. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 161.
84. Id. at 152.
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